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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif^Appellant, : Case No. 20040491-CA 
v. : 
WAYNE A. MOWER, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss the charge of issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003) (R. 1) (statute attached in Addendum A). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously determined that 
defendant could not be held criminally liable where he not only issued an insufficient-
funds check to an individual with the purpose of obtaining something of value for it, but 
he in fact received a secondary expected value when he failed to make good on the check 
to the credit union who had cashed it for the individual. 
Because "a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law[,]" it is 
reviewed for correctness, with no particular deference to its legal conclusions. State v. 
Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 
905 (Utah 1982)); see also State v. Spainhower, 988 P.2d 452, 453 (Utah App. 1999). 
This Court also reviews questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. State 
v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, If 3, 51 P.3d 729; see also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 
80, H 5, 52P.3dl276. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Only Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (2003), is relevant to the issue on appeal (in 
Add. A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of issuing a bad check (R. 
1). Defendant failed to appear at several hearings, then retained counsel and waived his 
preliminary hearing (R. 10, 14, 22-23, 29, 38-40). Defense counsel filed a motion to 
dismiss and supporting memorandum, arguing that, pursuant to State v. Green, 672 P.2d 
400 (Utah 1983), defendant could not be criminally liable for issuing a bad check because 
defendant "did not issue the check for the purpose of receiving any money [,]" he in fact 
"received nothing" in return for the check, and, therefore, there was a failure of proof on 
the essential elements of issuing a check "for the purpose of obtaining . . . [a] thing of 
value[.]" (R. 41-46). The State filed an opposing memorandum, and argument followed 
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(R. 50-54; R. 70: passim). The trial judge thereafter dismissed the charge, finding that 
defendant possessed no criminal intent, his failure to take action to protect the credit 
union did not constitute criminal conduct under the statute, and the statute provided for no 
criminal liability where defendant "did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value 
with a bad check" (R. 50, 56-57; R. 70: 31-33) (ruling attached in Addendum B). 
The parties were unable to agree on findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 
55). Consequently, the trial judge drafted his own (R. 58-61) (attached in Addendum B). 
The State timely appealed the ruling (R. 62-63). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Defendant operates "A-Quick Loan," a business in which customers "place the 
title to automobiles as security for short term loans" (R. 58; R. 70:7). On June 12, 2002, 
the defendant and Nick Kirkman entered into an agreement whereby defendant would 
loan Kirkman $4,900.00, and, in return, Kirkman would repay the loan and, later the same 
day, deliver a title to one of Kirkman's vehicles as security for the loan (R. 58-59; R. 
70:7). Defendant gave Kirkman the check as agreed (R. 59; R. 70: 7). Although the two 
men had done business in the past, defendant made sure that the account on which the 
because defendant waived his preliminary hearing, the State takes its facts as 
stated by the parties to the district court in their argument on the motion to dismiss, and 
from the district court's Findings of Fact (R. 58-59; R. 70: 1-30). Defendant has not been 
tried and so retains the presumption of innocence. 
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check was written would have insufficient funds to cover the check until after Kirkman 
had delivered the title as promised (R. 59; R. 70: 7-10). 
Kirkman never delivered the vehicle title to defendant (R. 59; R. 70:8). However, 
he deposited the check into his account at Weber State Credit Union ["credit union5'] (R. 
59). He then proceeded to write checks against the deposit until the entire sum was 
depleted (R. 59; R. 70:7). The credit union covered the checks (R. 70:10). 
The credit union presented the check to defendant's bank, which would not honor 
the check due to insufficient funds in the account (R. 59; R. 70: 9). Glen Sederholm, the 
vice president of the credit union, sent defendant a fourteen-day demand letter via 
certified mail, seeking payment for the dishonored check (R. 59). Defendant accepted the 
notice, but failed to make good on the check (id). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on a 
misreading of the plain language of the charging statute. The district court's findings of 
fact contain two relevant misinterpretations: 1) the statute requires the State to prove that 
defendant received something of value in exchange for the check; and 2) the statute does 
not place on defendant any obligation to cover the check. 
To the contrary, the language of subparagraph (2) of the bad check statute under 
which defendant was charged provides that the check be issued "for the purpose of 
obtaining" something of value and that the accused is guilty "if he fails to make good and 
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actual payment.. . within 14 days" of receiving notice that the check was rejected by the 
drawee: 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment 
of money ,for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft 
is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if 
he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the 
check or draft's nonpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003) (emphasis added). Add. A. The plain language of 
this statute establishes that the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. 
The trial court's conclusions of law elaborate on those misstated facts, faulting the 
State for failing to establish that defendant "obtained something of value" in return for his 
check; that defendant "possessed any criminal intent" where he did not cause a loss to the 
credit union; and that defendant committed a criminal act "contemplated by the statute as 
charged" where he failed to take any action to protect the credit union. The dismissal of 
the charge against defendant cannot be based on these conclusions because the plain 
language of the statute does not require the State to establish any of these points. 
Finally, the district court incorrectly applied the analysis in State v. Green, 672 
P.2d 400 (1990), to this case where, not only are the facts and circumstances readily 
distinguishable, but the charge in Green was based on the bad check statute before 
subsection (2) was added, and the elements of the offense detailed in subsection (2) are 
not the same as those in the statute giving rise to Green. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE CHARGING STATUTE; UNDER THE 
APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION, DISMISSAL IS 
INAPPROPRIATE 
The trial court erroneously determined that dismissal was appropriate because the 
State had not established defendant's criminal liability under Utah Code Annotated,§ 76-
6-505(2) (R. 58-61; R. 70: 31-33). Add. B. The trial court based its decision on the 
absence of proof that: 1) defendant "in fact" received anything of value in this 
transaction; 2) defendant did more than "innocently" write a check or that he harbored 
any " intent to defraud anyone" in this case; and 3) defendant "caus[ed ] the loss" to the 
credit union (id). In making these determinations, the trial court overlooked the plain 
and unambiguous language of the statute and relevant case law. 
A, The Trial Court's Ruling 
After hearing argument from the parties, the district court determined that the 
matter was controlled by State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983) (R. 60; R. 70:31-33) 
(in Addendum C). The court began by noting that, although other courts had 
distinguished Green, it could not do so (R. 70:31). Add. B. 
But, frankly, I do not see that it makes a difference. The purpose of 
obtaining — he issued the check with the purpose of obtaining something 
of value. The argument of the State is that he intended to get a title and 
repayment of a loan. 
But, frankly, that gets into the civil aspect of this case. And he did 
not, in fact, receive anything of value in this transaction. And I do not 
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believe that the statute should criminalize the conduct that occurred here 
against the person that actually issued the check because, in fact, civil 
remedies do exist for that. And to make it a crime for someone to 
innocently write a check and then be defrauded by the recipient of that 
check, and then that person deposits the check after committing the fraud 
and draws the money out of it, I do not think distinguishes it sufficiently 
from Green to say that the holding in Green should not apply. 
Now, the sad thing about this is Weber State Credit Union does 
suffer. But as far as charging Mr. Mower, who had no criminal intent in 
this case, to charge him with a crime I think is beyond the scope of the 
statute. 
And he quite clearly could be civilly liable for this, even though it 
wasn't his intent to defraud anyone. He did put his check in the commercial 
stream. And it's very much like a husband and a wife getting divorced at 
that point then if they had debts that were civil in nature, then they both end 
up being civilly responsible for those debts. 
But as far as criminally culpable, I can not see that the statute is 
intended, in light of Green, to include Mr. Mower as one of those who 
should be criminally liable, therefore. 
(R. 70:31-33). Add. B. 
When the parties thereafter were unable to agree on specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the district court judge entered his own, which provided in relevant 
part: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
9. Mower gave the check for $4,900.00 to Kirkman who defrauded 
him by failing to deliver title to a vehicle as security for repayment and 
therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value in exchange for the 
check. 
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10. The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the 
criminal law to cover the $4,900.00 check issued herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who 
then defrauded Mower is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of 
UCA § 76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that Mower obtained something of 
value in return for payment of the $4,900.00. 
3. The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in 
this matter as Kirkman engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained 
the financial benefit of the deception, thereby causing the loss to his own 
credit union. 
4. Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check 
in good faith and suffered a loss by paying out from Kirkman's account, it 
was Kirkman's deception to Mower and subsequent deposit of the 
fraudulently obtained check in his account that caused . . . the loss to Weber 
State Credit Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have 
stopped payment on the check or taken other action to protect the credit 
union, but his failure to do so does not constitute a criminal act 
contemplated by the statute as charged. 
5. The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of 
the case of State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in 
Green and this case are distinguishable. 
6. Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2) 
as he did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value with a bad 
check. 
(R. 59-60). Add. B. The State contends that each of these statements results from a 
misreading of the statute and fails to support the dismissal of the charge. 
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B. Relevant Statutory Provisions and Applicable Law 
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's bad check statute, which 
provides that a person who issues a check for the purpose of obtaining something of value 
is guilty of issuing a bad check if he does not make payment on the check within fourteen 
days of receiving actual notice that the drawee refused payment: 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft 
is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if 
he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the 
check or draft's nonpayment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003). Add. A. 
State v. Green, referred to by the district court, was decided before a 1983 
amendment to the statute divided the offense of issuing a bad check into two types of 
conduct. The pre-1983 statute discussed in Green provided that a person was guilty of 
issuing a bad check if he issued a check for the purpose of obtaining something of value, 
knowing at the time that the check will not be paid by the drawee, and the drawee in fact 
refuses payment on the check: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1978) (in Addendum A). 
The State's challenge primarily involves the district court's interpretation of the 
statute. When faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, "[an appellate court's] 
primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 
UT 56, Tf 25, 4 P.3d 795. Accordingly, an appellate court presumes that the legislature 
used each term of a statute advisedly, and only looks beyond the plain language if it is 
ambiguous. State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, \ 22, 989 P.2d 1091; see also Burns, 
2000 UT 56, \ 25. The court "avoid[s] interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative." State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, ^ 6, n.4, 51 
P.3d 729 (quoting State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citations 
omitted)). 
C. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Underlying the District Court's 
Decision Do Not Support the Court's Ruling 
The district court judge based his decision on his determination that: 1) defendant 
did not, "in fact," receive anything of value in this transaction; 2) defendant "innocently" 
wrote a check while harboring no "intent to defraud anyone" in this case; and 3) 
defendant did not "caus[e ] the loss" to the credit union (R. 58-61; R. 70: 31-33). Add. B. 
None of these findings supports the dismissal of the charge in this case. 
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1. The current statute does not require that defendant receive something of 
value 
The district court's finding of fact number 9 is irrelevant to his guilt under 
subsection 2: 
Mower gave the check for $4,900.00 to Kirkman who defrauded him 
by failing to deliver title to a vehicle as security for repayment and 
therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value in exchange for the 
check. 
(R. 59; Finding of Fact #9) (emphasis added). Add. B. The court's conclusions of law 
number 2 and 6 are improper statements of the elements of subsection 2: 
The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who then 
defrauded Mower is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of UCA 
§ 76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that Mower obtained something of value 
in return for payment of the $4,900.00. 
Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2) as 
he did not obtain or intend to obtain something of value with a bad check. 
(R. 60; Conclusions of Law ## 2, 6) (emphasis added). Add. B. 
The statute under which defendant was charged requires that the State establish the 
following elements: (1) that defendant issued or passed a check (2) "for the purpose of 
obtaining" something of value, (3) payment of which was legally refused by the drawee, 
and (4) defendant received actual notice of the draft's nonpayment, but (5) failed to pay 
the draft within the following fourteen days. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (2003); 
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see also State v. Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1986) (interpreting subsection (1) 
of the statute, holding that if defendant "issued a bad check knowing that it would not be 
paid by the drawee at presentment and that defendant issued the checker the purpose of 
obtaining something ofvalue[,]" he's guilty) (original emphasis omitted; emphasis 
added). Nothing in the statute requires that the State prove that defendant in fact obtained 
something in exchange for the bad check, as required by the lower court.2 
The plain language of the entire statute reveals that the clear legislative purpose of 
the statute is to protect the integrity of checks by preventing the negotiation and delivery 
of worthless instruments into commerce. See State v. Berry, 358 So.2d 545, 545 (Fla. 
1978) (purpose of bad check statute is to "ban[] the circulation of worthless commercial 
paper because of the danger it poses to the flow of trade[.]"). To that end, the plain 
language of subsection (2) as it relates to this case requires that the check be issued "for 
the purpose of obtaining" a "thing of value[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2) (emphasis 
added). "Purpose" is defined as "An objective, goal, or end" (Black's Law Dictionary, 
Eighth Ed. 2004); "something that one sets before himself as an object to be attained: an 
Notwithstanding that the State need not prove the receipt of something of value in 
order to obtain a conviction under subsection (2), that parties agree that the parties 
entered into a loan arrangement, implying that defendant received Kirkman's promise to 
repay the loan (R. 58-59; R. 70:7-8). Defendant simply failed to get security. Defendant 
also received the intervention of a third party "guarantor" of Kirkman's performance 
which enabled him to put a facially-negotiable check into commerce without risking his 
own finances. Plus, defendant received Kirkman's promise to repay the loan, from which 
has arisen a right of action against Kirkman. 
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end or aim to be kept in view, in any plan, measure, exertion, or operation[.]" Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary, p. 1847, copyright 1993. 
The trial court read the statute as requiring that defendant actually "obtain" 
something of value, thereby rendering superfluous the legislature's inclusion of the 
broader phrase "for the purpose off.]" As the language in the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, and each term therein is presumed to have been used "advisedly and .. . 
according to its ordinary meaning[,]" the district court's interpretation is incorrect. See 
McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, \ 6, n.4 (quoting Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, \ 10 
(citations omitted)). Accordingly, the trial court's finding # 9 and conclusion #2 that the 
State did not establish that defendant "obtained something of value in return for payment 
of the $4,900.00" are incorrect, and do not support dismissal of the case. See 
Bartholomew, 724 P.2d at 354. 
Additionally, the lower court's conclusion #6 that defendant "should not be 
criminally liable under UCA § 76-6-505(2) as he did not . . . intend to obtain something 
of value" runs contrary to the evidence. A review of the arguments and the facts agreed 
to below shows that defendant issued the check "for the purpose o f obtaining both the 
title to one of Kirkman's vehicles and his loan obligation (R. 58-59; R. 70: 7-8). There is 
no dispute that defendant intended for Kirkman to obtain $4,900.00 from defendant's 
account only after Kirkman had delivered the vehicle title to defendant (id). 
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Accordingly, the dismissal cannot be properly based on the State's failure to establish 
what the plain language of the statute does not require. 
2. Kirkman's conduct does not negate defendant's criminal liability or his 
criminal intent under subsection (2) 
The district court's finding of fact number 10 misstates the plain language of 
subsection (2): 
The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the criminal 
law to cover the $4,900.00 check issued herein. 
(R. 59; Finding of Fact #10) (emphasis added). Add. B. Further, the court's conclusions 
of law number 3 and 4 are incorrect statements of the requirements of subsection (2): 
The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in this 
matter as Kirbnan engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained the 
financial benefit of the deception, thereby causing the loss to his own credit 
union. 
Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check in 
good faith and suffered a loss by paying out from Kirbnan's account, it was 
Kirkman 's deception to Mower and subsequent deposit of the fraudulently 
obtained check in his account that caused. . . the loss to Weber State Credit 
Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have stopped 
payment on the check or taken other action to protect the credit union, but 
his failure to do so does not constitute a criminal act contemplated by the 
statute as charged. 
(R. 60; Conclusions of Law ## 3-4) (emphasis added). Add. B. 
These findings and conclusions demonstrate the district court's focus on Kirkman 
and his degree of culpability in defrauding the credit union. However, the statute does 
not distinguish between degrees of culpability or the identity of the one presenting the 
14 
check for payment and receiving its proceeds. These findings and conclusions cannot 
stand in the face of the plain language of subsection (2) of the bad check statute. 
Intent to defraud is not an element of the offense of writing bad checks under 
either subparagraph of the statute. See State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1983) 
(noting that it was purposefully removed by the legislature in the 1977 revision of the 
statute); see also State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228, 1231 n.4 (Utah App. 1989), affd 858 
P.2d 926 (Utah 1992). Further, only subsection (1) expressly requires knowledge on the 
part of the check issuer that the drawee will legally refuse to pay the check, which 
knowledge is satisfied by evidence that the issuer knew that the account on which the 
check was written had been depleted to the point the check would not be honored. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1); see Bartholomew, 724 P.2d at 354; Delmotte, 665 P.2d at 
1315 (addressing the pre-1983 version of the statute, holding that "4[k]nowledge' of the 
account's depletion is a material element of the offense charged"). 
Defendant herein was charged under subsection (2), which targets similar, but not 
identical, situations as those encompassed by subsection (1). See Bartholomew, 724 P.2d 
at 354 ("subparagraph (2) of § 76-6-505 makes criminal the issuance of bad checks in 
certain circumstances which subparagraph (1) does not reach."). Subsection (2) contains 
no knowledge requirement, but instead encompasses the situation where "a person writes 
a bad check and does not know that there are insufficient funds in his account, or 
negligently or in good faith believes that it will be paid and it is not[.]" Id. In such a 
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situation, the person is not guilty of issuing a bad check "unless he fails to make good on 
the check within fourteen days after actual notice of nonpayment by the drawee." Id. 
(emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(2). In other words, under 
subsection (2), it is not the existence of any criminal intent in the issuance of the check 
but the fact that the issuer did not make good on the check as provided in the statute that 
determines defendant's liability for issuing the bad check. Consequently, the district 
court's finding that defendant "had no obligation under the criminal law to cover the . . . 
check[,]" and its conclusions that defendant possessed no "criminal intent" and that he is 
not criminally liable for failing to take action "to protect the credit union" run contrary to 
the plain language of subsection (2) and do not support dismissal of the charge against 
defendant. 
Defendant is not being prosecuted because he knew at the outset that his check 
would not be honored by his bank, or because he knew by the end of the day when he did 
not receive the title that the check would be rejected, or because he learned that Kirkman 
had cashed the check at the credit union, or because he took no action to protect the credit 
union. He is being prosecuted because, after receiving actual notice that the credit union 
cashed the facially-negotiable but worthless check he put into commerce, he did not pay 
the credit union the face amount of the check, as required by the statute. Neither party 
contested this fact below. Defendant knew, upon receipt of the demand from the credit 
union, that the check had been cashed and honored, and defendant's bank had refused to 
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pay it. With that knowledge, defendant represented that he would make good on the 
check, then failed to do so. This undisputed conduct brings defendant within the scope 
of subsection (2). 
3. The decision in State v. Green has no application to this case 
The district court's conclusion of law number 5 cannot stand upon a review of the 
analysis m State v. Green: 
The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of the 
case o/State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in Green 
and this case are distinguishable, 
(R. 59; Conclusion of Law #5). Add. B. 
Instead of reviewing the plain language of the statute, the trial judge looked to the 
case of State v. Green, 672 P.2d 400 (1990), finding that, despite distinguishable factors, 
the cases were sufficiently similar to make Green controlling in this matter (R. 60; R. 70: 
31-33). 
Green involved a review by the Utah Supreme Court of a conviction for an 
insufficient funds charge under the pre-1983 version of the statute that did not contain 
two separate subdivisions. Mr. and Mrs. Green went to a bank, opened a certificate of 
deposit in their own names, and wrote a check from another of their own accounts in 
another bank to cover the cost of the certificate. 672 P.2d at 400. Add. C. The next day, 
the couple changed their minds about the transaction and returned to the bank to cancel 
the certificate and get a refund. Id. Add. C. Although the bank had not yet cashed the 
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check, it refused to cancel the certificate without the Greens paying an early withdrawal 
penalty. Id. Add. C. The Greens refused. Id. Add. C. Subsequently, the bank 
processed the check, only to discover that the Greens had closed their bank account the 
same day they changed their mind on the certificate of deposit, and that the account had 
contained insufficient funds to cover the cost of the certificate of deposit. Id. Add. C. 
Therefore, the bank reported the insufficient funds check to the local police department, 
and Mr. Green was arrested and convicted. Id. Add. C. 
A majority of the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 401. Add. 
C. The majority of the Court found that the language of the statute at that time—now 
found in subsection (1)— required that defendant write the check for the purpose of 
obtaining from the bank "any money, property or other thing of value belonging to" the 
bank. Id. Add. C. The Court found that the State had failed to prove this element 
because, while defendant used his own money to open what amounted to a savings 
account and received a receipt (money market certificate of deposit) for his own funds, 
that receipt had no value until the check cleared the bank and the money was actually 
deposited in the bank, which never occurred. Id. Add. C. With no deposit occurring, the 
bank "did not part with anything of value which it owned" when it issued the 
certificate/receipt. Id. Add. C. Consequently, the Court said, defendant did not issue his 
check for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from the bank, defeating an essential 
element of the crime. Id. Add. C. 
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The district court in this case recognized that there were distinguishable facts 
between this case and Green, but found the "intent" behind the decision in Green to be 
controlling (R. 60). Add. B. Green involved numerous factors that differed from this 
case which, together, render the analysis in Green inapplicable to this case. The main 
difference is the involvement in this matter of subsection (2) of the statute, criminalizing 
the unknowing issuance of a bad check where defendant fails to make good on the check 
within 14 days of receiving notice that the check was dishonored. This is in contrast to 
the statute in Green which required knowledge that the check would not be honored. 
Subsection (2) was not yet drafted when Green was charged and convicted, but it is the 
sole basis of the charge in this matter (R. 1). 
While Green was decided on the basis of language which appears in both 
subsections under the current statute—"for the purpose of obtaining . . . [something of 
value"—the analysis in Green is inapplicable to this prosecution under subsection (2). 
See Green, 672 P.2d at 401. Add. C. In Green, the Supreme Court pointed out 
The undisputed evidence is that the defendant did not write the check 
for the purpose of obtaining from United [the bank] any money, property or 
other thing of value belonging to United. It was not intended by either 
United or the defendant that United would give him anything for his check. 
It was their intention that the defendant open a savings account in his own 
name with his own money. 
Representatives of United Savings testified that the certificate issued 
to the defendant was not negotiable and could not be redeemed, cashed or 
borrowed against until the check creating the deposit had cleared the bank 
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upon which it was drawn and defendant's funds were in United's 
possession, which normally took seven days. Thus United did not part with 
anything of value which it owned when it issued the certificate. 
There is no claim made by the State that the defendant attempted to 
make any use of the certificate. United did not incur any liability on the 
certificate, including any liability to pay interest thereon. Because of its 
policy of waiting until the depositor's check cleared before honoring the 
certificate, United was never at any risk. . . . 
Green, 672 P.2d at 401 (emphasis added). The focus of this explanation is on the fact 
that "[i]t was not intended by either United or the defendant that United would give him 
anything for his check." Id. The remainder of the analysis merely demonstrates that in 
fact nothing was given for the check, thereby supporting the Court's statement that 
nothing was intended to be given. 
The same cannot be said about the case at bar. The undisputed evidence here is 
that defendant, in the course of his business and pursuant to a year-long business 
relationship with Kirkman, wrote his check for the purpose of obtaining from Kirkman 
his immediate promise to repay the loan—presumably with interest— and the promise to 
deliver the title to one of his vehicles to be held as security pending repayment of the loan 
(R. 58-59; R. 70: 7). Add. B. Hence, unlike in Green, it was not only intended by 
defendant, if not Kirkman, at the time defendant tendered the check that defendant would 
receive something of value for the check, but he in fact got a promise from defendant to 
repay the loan. In addition: 
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-defendant admits to having intentionally lowered the balance in the account on 
which the check was written so that the check would not clear the account in the 
event Kirkman did not deliver the promised title (R. 70: 7-10); 
-defendant failed to pay the credit union when he received notice that his 
bank had refused to honor the check (R. 59); 
-the check was facially negotiable throughout the duration of the 
transaction at issue, appearing to have value to any who accepted it in the 
course of commerce (R. 59; R. 70: 7-8); and 
-defendant in fact received a "thing of value" by shifting what should have 
been his own loss to a third party, leaving his own finances in tact. 
Consequently, unlike the defendant's use of his own money in the Green 
transaction, defendant's actions here insured that his own money would not be at risk 
should Kirkman fail to perform as agreed. Defendant's conduct predictably ensured that 
some third party who honored the check then attempted to collect from defendant's 
account would, in essence, become the guarantor of Kirkman's performance: if Kirkman 
never produced the vehicle title, the guarantor would never collect from defendant on the 
check. Given the nature of defendant's business and the suggestion that he had done this 
before, any reasonable person would know that, when he issued the check and made sure 
that it was written on an account containing insufficient funds, the outcome faced by the 
credit union was possible. Once notified of his bank's failure to pay the credit union, 
defendant undeniably knew what had occurred and still failed to make good on the check. 
Hence, he not only issued the check "for the purpose" of obtaining the title to Kirkman's 
vehicle and, hence, a profitable business loan, but, he arguably knew that, should that 
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anticipated "thing of value" not materialize, he would ensure that someone besides 
himself shouldered the burden of loss should Kirkman cash the check anyway or go 
through a third party. 
The credit union parted with value when it gave its money to Kirkman in exchange 
for the check, expecting that defendant's bank would honor the check on presentment. 
Further, despite the fact that it was Kirkman who tendered the check to the credit union, it 
was defendant's issuance of the insufficient-funds check, together with his failure to 
make good on the check, that caused the credit union to ultimately suffer the loss. 
Accordingly, none of the points identified in Green as establishing that the case 
was "nothing more than the defendant writing himself a worthless check" exist in this 
case: defendant wrote the check for the purpose of obtaining a thing of value, he intended 
to obtain benefit for the check, the check had value upon its issuance, the check placed 
third parties at risk where it was negotiable but was based on an account containing 
insufficient funds to cover it, the credit union parted with something of value when it 
cashed the check, and defendant failed two opportunities to remedy the credit union's 
loss. Because the missing element in Green was present in this case, the district court's 




For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order dismissing the felony charge against defendant and remand the matter 
for further proceedings. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State requests that this matter be set for oral argument and that a published 
opinion issue. This case presents an important issue regarding protection of the integrity 
of commercial paper. The district courts appear to require guidance in their interpretation 
of the relevant statute to insure uniformity in their treatment of these cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^day of November, 2004. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
[S C. LEON. 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were hand-deliverec^mailed by first-cla^s mail, postage-prepaid, to John T. 
Caine, Richards, Caine & Allen, P.C., attorneys for defendant/appellee, 2568 Washington 
Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, this / /day of November, 2004. 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in 
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of 
not more than $200, such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this s ta te 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$200 but not more t h a n $300, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$300 but not more t h a n $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$1,000, such offense shall be a second degree felony. 
(2003) 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check—Presumption.—(1) Any person who 
issues or passes a check for the payment of money, for the purpose of ob-
taining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, knowing i t will not be paid by the drawee and payment is 
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check. 
(2) For purposes of this section, a person who issues a check for which 
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check would 
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or series of checks made or drawn in this state within 
a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not more than $100, 
such offense shall be a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or checks drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $100 but not more than 
$250, such offense shall be a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $250 but not more 
than $1,000, such offense shall be a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or checks made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense 
shall be a second degree felony. 
(1978) 
Addendum B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE A. MOWER, 
Defendant. 
MAY % 1 ?fW4 
On the 30th day of January, 2004 a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge Roger S. 
Dutson regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Present was Brenda J. Beaton, Deputy Weber 
County Attorney representing the State; John T. Caine, representing defendant, Wayne A. Mower; 
and Wayne A. Mower, defendant. 
The parties argued the matter and submitted the matter to the Court for decision. The Court 
having reviewed all the pleadings and having considered argument of the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, now makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this 
matter and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mower operates A-Quick Loan business and had done business loaning money to Kirkman 
in return for automobile titles as security for repayment during the year prior to this incident. 
2. On or about June 12, 2002, defendant, Wayne A. Mower, (Mower) who operates a title 
loan business in which persons place the title to automobiles as security for short term loans, was 
approached by one Nick Kirkman (Kirkman) for a loan of $4,900 00 secured by an automobile title. 
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3. Mower informed Kirkman that he would loan the $4,900.00 based upon previous business 
dealings of the parties in which Mower prepared a check for Kirkman and then Kirkman immediately 
delivered the title to Mower. 
4. Mower gave Kirkman a check for $4,900.00 and Kirkman defrauded Mower by never 
bringing him the title to the vehicle. 
5. Kirkman deposited the check into his own bank account at the Weber State Credit Union 
and they paid out money relying on the validity of the check. 
6. Mower refused to honor the check fraudulently obtained by Kirkman and used for 
Kirkman's benefit. 
7. Weber State Credit Union sent a notice to Mower to make good on the check within 14 
days and he refused to do so. 
8. The State filed third degree felony criminal charges against Mower pursuant to UCA §76-
6-505(2) which statute reads: 
"Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of any money, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any 
money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is 
guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to 
the payee in the amount of the refused check, or draft within 14 days of his receiving 
actual notice of check or draft's nonpayment." 
9. Mower gave the check for $4,900 00 to Kirkman who defrauded him by failing to deliver 
title to a vehicle as security for repayment and therefore, Mower did not receive anything of value 
in exchange for the check. 
10. The Court finds that Mower had no obligation under the criminal law to cover the 
$4,900 00 check issued herein. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has both personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction 
over this dispute. 
2. The Court finds that the promise to deliver title by Kirkman who then defrauded Mower 
is not sufficient to satisfy the statutory provision of UCA §76-6-505(2) of the State's claim that 
Mower obtained something of value in return for payment of the $4,900.00. 
3. The Court cannot find Mower possessed any criminal intent in this matter as Kirkman 
engaged in deception of Mower and then obtained the financial benefit of the deception, thereby 
causing the loss to his own credit union. 
4. Even though Weber State Credit Union accepted Mower's check in good faith and 
suffered a loss by paying out from Kirkman's account, it was Kirkman's deception to Mower and 
subsequent deposit of the fraudulently obtained check in his account that caused of the loss to Weber 
State Credit Union. The Court recognizes that Mower could possibly have stopped payment on the 
check or taken other action to protect the credit union, but his failure to do so does not constitute 
a criminal act contemplated by the statute as charged. 
5. The Court believes its findings are consistent with the intent of the case of State v Green, 
672 P 2d 400 (1990), even though the facts in Green and this case are distinguishable. 
6. Mower should not be criminally liable under UCA §76-6-505(2) as he did not obtain or 
intend to obtain something of value with a bad check. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law: 
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It is hereby Ordered that the criminal charge against Wayne A. Mower of Issuing a Bad 
Check, a third degree felony, in violations of UCA §76-6-505(2) on June 12, 2002 is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this f t day of May, 2004. 
ROGER S/DUTSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this^lf^"' 
day of May, 2004: 
BRENDA J. BEATON 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
2380 Washington Blvd., 2nd Floor 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Defendant 
2491 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
-jvaM. \Kjmd 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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way he does business. The State -- the State — he hasn't 
violated any — any rules or business transactions by the way 
he does business, if he does it in the way that the facts 
describe and for the purposes of this hearing have been 
accepted. 
So, you know, to characterize that conduct again leads 
me to believe that really what the State is telling you is he 
wrote a check, Weber State's out the money, it's not their 
fault, he needs to be prosecuted. 
Well, that's not what the law says. And, therefore, the 
case should be dismissed. 
THE COURT: I've reviewed the Green case carefully 
and other cases that have referred to Green. And, of course, 
most of the subsequent cases are stating that Green does not 
apply because of differences in — in the facts. 
And I think Green is somewhat distinguished from this 
case at hand in that the transaction involved was entirely 
between the person charged with the crime and the United 
Credit Union. That is a distinguishing factor that isn't 
involved here because we do have Weber State Credit Union 
taking the loss in this case whereas in United the — there 
was no third party that was damaged. 
But, frankly, I do not see that it makes a difference. 
The purpose of obtaining — he issued the check with the 
purpose of obtaining something of value. The argument of the 
Laurie Shingle, RER 
(801) 395-1055 
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State is that he intended to get a title and repayment of a 
loan. 
But, frankly, that gets into the civil aspect of this 
case. And he did not, in fact, receive anything of value in 
this transaction. And I do not believe that the statute 
should criminalize the conduct that occurred here against the 
person that actually issued the check because, in fact, civil 
remedies do exist for that. And to make it a crime for 
someone to innocently write a check and then be defrauded by 
the recipient of that check, and then that person deposits 
the check after committing the fraud and draws the money out 
of it, I do not think distinguishes it sufficiently from 
Green to say that the holding in Green should not apply. 
Now, the sad thing about this is Weber State Credit 
Union does suffer. But as far as charging Mr. Mower, who had 
no criminal intent in this case, to charge him with a crime I 
think is beyond the scope of the statute. 
And he quite clearly could be civilly liable for this, 
even though it wasn!t his intent to defraud anyone. He did 
put his check in the commercial stream. And it!s very much 
like a husband and a wife getting divorced at that point then 
if they had debts that were civil in nature, then they both 
end up being civilly responsible for those debts. 
But as far as criminally culpable, I can not see that 
the statute is intended, in light of Green, to include 
Laurie Shingle, RPR 
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Mr. Mower as one of those who should be criminally liable, 
therefore. 
And then the Court is granting the — the motion of 
defense here. 
MR. CAINE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Caine, you1re going to have to 
prepare full findings — 
MR. CAINE: Findings? All right. 
THE COURT: — and conclusions. 
MR. CAINE: If I can just ask here — 
THE COURT: The sad thing about it is Weber State 
Credit Union suffers, but I do not believe that in the 
criminal scheme of things that's covered by what is happening 
here. I feel badly for that. But I think the remedy is 
civil, under the circumstances, or criminal against Kirkland 
(sic) who committed the fraud, perhaps. I don!t know all of 
his — that he would have to say en it, but he did not give 
the title and he did not give them anything of value as far 
as 
to 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
John F. GREEN, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 18018. 
Oct. 18, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted before the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Peter F. Leary, J., of 
issuing a bad check, and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that evidence was 
insufficient to sustain conviction. 
Reversed. 
Hall, C.J., dissented and filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
False Pretenses €==>49(1) 
170k49(l) Most Cited Cases 
Evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction of 
issuing a bad check. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505. 
*400 David K. Smith, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Earl Dorms, Asst. 
Arty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal by the defendant John F. Green 
from a conviction by a jury of issuing a bad check 
in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505. 
On February 24, 1981 the defendant and his wife, 
LaRue Green, entered the branch office of United 
Savings & Loan Company in West Jordan, Utah 
shortly before closing time for the purpose of 
opening a $10,000 savings account. UQ wrote a 
check for that amount drawn on the Greens' 
checking account at the West Jordan branch of the 
Draper Bank & Trust Company. They were given 
a $10,000 money market certificate which would 
mature in six months. [FN1] 
FN1. They were also given a gift 
certificate but it was not introduced into 
evidence. Hence we have no information 
as to its nature or whether it had any value. 
We note that some "gift certificates" only 
provide a discount on the purchase of a 
product which the donee may not wish to 
purchase. 
The following day, shortly after noon, the 
defendant returned to United, and according to the 
testimony of the only two employees who talked to 
him he asked to "cancel or close" the certificate. 
[FN2] Although United still had the check in its 
office and had not yet deposited it in its account, it 
refused his request unless he would pay a penalty of 
six months' interest on the $10,000. Defendant 
declined to agree to payment of the penalty and left 
the premises to talk to his wife. He soon returned 
with her and they requested to talk to United's 
manager. The manager, too, denied their request 
unless they would pay the penalty. She did, 
however, offer to call the main office of United to 
ascertain if the penalty could be waived. The 
Greens thereupon left United without resolving the 
matter. Shortly thereafter, employees of United 
telephoned the Draper bank and were told that the 
Greens' account on which the check was drawn had 
been closed at about noon that day. United then 
voided its copy of the certificate and a few days 
later it presented the check to Draper Bank where it 
was stamped "account closed" and returned unpaid 
to United. When the defendant closed his bank 
account it had a balance of only $6.28, and a check 
for $10,000 would not have cleared at any time 
subsequent to November 5, 1980. The defendant 
testified that when he wrote the check he was 
expecting payment due him of *401 a draft the next 
day, which money he would use to cover the check. 
He also claimed that he had sufficient money in 
another account to cover the check but that later he 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
http://printwestlaw.com/delivery.html?dest=atp&dataid-B0055800 10/29/2004 
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changed his mind about purchasing the certificate 
and did not make the necessary transfer of funds. 
FN2. The dissent states that he requested 
to "cash" the certificate. This was the 
testimony of a teller who was leaving for 
lunch who overheard part of the 
defendant's conversation with another 
teller who waited on him. However, the 
latter and the manager both testified that he 
wanted to "cancel or close" the certificate. 
In any event, that difference in testimony 
is inconsequential since the certificate 
could not be cashed under United's policy. 
Section 76-6-505(1) under which the defendant 
was convicted provides: 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check for 
the payment of money, for the purpose of 
obtaining ... any money, property, or other thing 
of value ... knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is 
guilty of issuing a bad check. 
In accordance, the trial court instructed the jury 
that before they could convict the defendant they 
would have to find, among other things, that he 
"issued said check for the purpose of obtaining 
money, property or other thing of value from United 
Savings." The State completely failed to produce 
any evidence which would satisfy this requirement 
and the conviction of the defendant must be 
reversed. 
The undisputed evidence is that the defendant did 
not write the check for the purpose of obtaining 
from United any money, property or other thing of 
value belonging to United. It was not intended by 
either United or the defendant that United would 
give him anything for his check. It was their 
intention that the defendant open a savings account 
in his own name with his own money. The check 
was written for the purpose of transferring the funds 
from the defendant's bank account to the new 
account established at United. The money market 
certificate was nothing more than a receipt for his 
own funds (not United's) which he intended to 
deposit but later changed his mind and did not 
deposit. The certificate itself had no value until the 
check creating the deposit cleared the bank upon 
which it was drawn and a deposit in United came 
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into being. Before that happened, the defendant 
aborted the transfer of funds by closing the bank 
account and by failing to deposit funds sufficient 
therein to cover the $10,000 check. Thus no 
deposit in United Savings was ever established and 
the certificate remained a nullity. 
Representatives of United Savings testified that the 
certificate issued to the defendant was not 
negotiable and could not be redeemed, cashed or 
borrowed against until the check creating the 
deposit had cleared the bank upon which it was 
drawn and defendant's funds were in United's 
possession, which normally took seven days. Thus 
United did not part with anything of value which it 
owned when it issued the certificate. It only failed 
to acquire defendant's account and deposit in its 
institution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be 
said that the defendant issued his check for the 
purpose of obtaining any money, property or thing 
of value from United. An essential element of the 
crime was missing. 
There is no claim made by the State that the 
defendant attempted to make any use of the 
certificate. United did not incur any liability on the 
certificate, including any liability to pay interest 
thereon. Because of its policy of waiting until the 
depositor's check cleared before honoring the 
certificate, United was never at any risk. Our 
statute simply does not make it a crime for a person 
to write a bad check on one account and deposit it 
to another account of his where the "deposit" is not 
and could not be drawn against until the check has 
cleared. This case involves nothing more than the 
defendant writing himself a worthless check. 
The conviction and sentence of the defendant is 
reversed. 
STEWART, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I do not join the opinion of the Court because, in 
my view, it invades the province of the jury, whose 
prerogative it is to determine the facts. The Court 
repeatedly asserts as fact that United "did not part" 
with anything of value. However, this is but an 
ipse dixit in light of the contrary conclusion reached 
by the jury. 
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*402 The well-recognized rules of appellate review 
require us to view the record in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. When so viewed, the 
record before us supports the following factual 
synopsis. 
On February 24, 1981, just prior to closing time of 
6:00 p.m., defendant purchased from United 
Savings & Loan Association (United) a $10,000 
money market certificate to mature in six months. 
He paid for the certificate with his personal check in 
the amount of $10,000, drawn on the Draper Bank 
& Trust (bank). 
The following day, at 12:45 p.m., defendant 
returned to United and sought not to "cancel or 
close" the certificate, but to surrender the 
certificate for cash This prompted United's teller 
to advise that early withdrawal of the funds required 
the assessment of an interest penalty. Defendant 
expressed dissatisfaction with the penalty, stating 
that he had a note which had come due and that he 
was in need of all of the money to pay it off. [FN1] 
Defendant then departed without resolving the 
matter. He returned in a few minutes, at which 
time he sought out United's manager and had a 
similar discussion about the penalty to be applied in 
the event of early withdrawal. At that time, 
defendant advised the manager that he had expected 
to receive some additional funds that morning 
which had not materialized. Again defendant left 
without resolving the matter and without requesting 
the return of his check. 
FN1. Had it been defendant's intention 
only to "cancel or close" the certificate as 
is surmised by the Court, surely there 
would have been no discussion of a 
penalty for early withdrawal. 
United's teller and manager discussed the 
variances in defendant's statements about his 
financial affairs and then called the drawee bank, 
whereupon they were informed that the account was 
closed. They thereafter presented the check for 
payment and it was returned, marked "account 
closed." Defendant closed the account at noon on 
February 25, after verifying to the bank that there 
were no outstanding checks to be paid. At that 
time, the account reflected a balance of only $6.28, 
and a check for $10,000 would not have cleared any 
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time subsequent to November 5, 1980. 
Defendant defended on the theory that it was his 
intention to cover the check upon its presentation 
for payment and that he simply wanted to cancel the 
transaction because, overnight, he had changed his 
mind about the purchase of the certificate, desiring 
instead to invest the funds in diamonds. 
In his opening statement, defense counsel 
represented that the evidence would show that 
defendant had the financial ability and that he in 
fact intended to cover the check. This prompted a 
discussion with the court outside the presence of the 
jury, at which time defense counsel took the 
position that defendant was entitled to present 
evidence of his accounts with other financial 
institutions in order to dispel any intent to defraud. 
Counsel for the State lodged an objection to such 
evidence on the grounds of relevancy and asserted 
that the State had no burden to prove intent to 
defraud, but only that defendant passed a check 
"knowing it would not be paid," as expressly set 
forth in the statute. [FN2] The trial judge agreed, 
but withheld his ruling on the objection, stating, "If 
the evidence comes in that way, I'll make a ruling 
on it at that time ...." 
FN2. U.C.A, 1953, § 76-6-505(1). 
At trial, defendant testified that it was his intention 
to cover the check with the funds he expected to 
receive the following morning in payment of a debt, 
and although the funds were not received, he had 
other funds with which to cover the check. Later 
on in his testimony, he again stated that although he 
did not receive the expected funds, he had "another 
way in which to cover the check." However, he 
stopped short of testifying that it was ever his 
intention to cover the check with funds from such 
other sources. 
Defense counsel called two witnesses for the 
purpose of establishing that defendant had accounts 
at Cottonwood Thrift & Loan and at FMA Thrift & 
Loan. The State *403 renewed its objection on the 
grounds of relevancy. The trial judge sustained the 
objection on grounds of relevancy and foundation 
and declined to permit the witnesses to testify. 
On appeal, defendant urges three points of error: 
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(1) the court's refusal to permit the presentation of 
evidence of defendant's accounts with other 
financial institutions; (2) the court's refusal to give 
requested jury instructions bearing upon the subject 
of intent to defraud; and (3) insufficiency of the 
evidence on the element of consideration or value. 
The essential elements of the offense of issuing a 
bad check as charged in the instant case are that: 
(1) a check be issued for the payment of a sum in 
excess of $1,000; (2) the check be issued for the 
purpose of obtaining money, property, or other 
thing of value; (3) the check be issued knowing that 
it will not be paid; and (4) payment of the check is 
refused by the drawee. 
The trial court appropriately included each of the 
foregoing elements of the offense in its instructions 
to the jury. Defendant's contention that "intention 
to defraud" is also an essential element of the 
offense is not well-founded. While it is true that 
intent to defraud was an essential element of the 
offense under the former statute, [FN3] under the 
currently revised statute, § 76-6-505, supra, the 
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check 
"knowing it will not be paid." [FN4] In any event, 
the evidence offered by defendant was without 
relevance to the issues and was offered without 
foundation. 
FN3. U.C.A, 1953, § 76-20-11, so 
interpreted in State v. Coleman, 17 Utah 
2d 166, 406 P.2d 308 (1965). 
FN4. State v. Delmotte, Utah, 665 P.2d 
1314(1983). 
As the evidence came in, the only affirmative 
evidence offered of defendant's intention to cover 
the check came from his own testimony that he 
intended to cover it with the nebulous funds he 
expected on the following morning. When these 
funds were not forthcoming, he offered no evidence 
of any further intention he had to cover the check. 
Therefore, evidence of the fact that he may have 
been able to demonstrate some other ability to cover 
the check was clearly irrelevant. The evidence 
offered would have shown nothing more than the 
fact that defendant had other assets, not that he had 
any intention to utilize them to prevent the check 
from being dishonored. Thus, the trial court was 
Copr. © 2004 West. No ( 
Page 4 
well within its prerogative to preclude the 
presentation of such evidence on the grounds stated. 
Although the other witnesses were not permitted to 
testify as to defendant's other accounts, defendant 
himself testified that even though he did not receive 
the funds expected on the morning of February 25, 
he nevertheless had "another way in which to cover 
the check," and that he had "other funds with which 
to cover the deposit or the check of $10,000." 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the propriety of the 
trial judge's rulings on the evidentiary and jury 
instruction issues, in his closing argument to the 
jury defense counsel was afforded wide latitude to 
argue his theories of the case. He argued that 
defendant obtained nothing of value in return for his 
check because the money market certificate was not 
freely negotiable. He argued that no money 
changed hands, that defendant had no intention to 
obtain money, and that he only wanted to cancel, 
and not cash, the certificate because he had changed 
his mind. 
He further argued that defendant had no culpable 
intent and had no intent to cheat or defraud United 
of $10,000. but simply changed his mind because of 
two things: (1) a desire to invest in diamonds, and 
(2) the money he was expecting did not materialize. 
As was its prerogative, the jury chose not to believe 
defendant's explanation of his intentions. Rather, 
as was also its prerogative, the jury chose to believe 
the substantial, believable evidence that defendant 
issued the check knowing that it would not be paid 
on presentment. 
*404 In regard to defendant's remaining contention 
of error, that he obtained nothing in return for his 
bad check, the money market certificate was 
"property, or other thing" of value within the 
contemplation of § 76-6-505 if for no other reason 
than its value as collateral for a loan, to which 
defendant himself testified. However, in addition 
thereto, the evidence was that the certificate was 
negotiable for cash at United or any of its branches 
and that in fact defendant attempted to cash it. 
Also, defendant himself testified that in return for 
his $10,000 check he immediately received not only 
the money market certificate, but the gift certificates 
United ga\e as incentive for a $10,000 deposit. 
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The exact value of those certificates is not in 
evidence, but it is unimportant. The degree of the 
crime is determined by the amount of the bad check, 
not the value obtained for it. [FN5] 
FN5. U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505(3). 
I would affirm the jury conviction and the 
judgment of the trial court. 
672P.2d400 
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